

# REPORT FOR DECISION

<b>DECISION OF:</b>	<b>OVERVIEW &amp; SCRUTINY COMMITTEE CABINET COUNCIL</b>
<b>DATE:</b>	<b>12 FEBRUARY 2014 19 FEBRUARY 2014 19 FEBRUARY 2014</b>
<b>SUBJECT:</b>	<b>TREASURY MANAGEMENT STRATEGY AND PRUDENTIAL INDICATORS 2014/15</b>
<b>REPORT FROM:</b>	<b>DEPUTY LEADER &amp; CABINET MEMBER FOR FINANCE AND CORPORATE AFFAIRS</b>
<b>CONTACT OFFICER:</b>	<b>MIKE OWEN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF RESOURCES STEPHEN KENYON, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF RESOURCES (FINANCE AND EFFICIENCY)</b>
<b>TYPE OF DECISION:</b>	<b>COUNCIL</b>
<b>FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/STATUS:</b>	The report is for publication
<b>SUMMARY:</b>	<p>The report sets out the suggested Strategy for 2014/15 in respect of the following aspects of the Treasury Management function. It is based upon the Treasury officers' views on interest rates, supplemented with leading market forecasts provided by the Council's treasury advisor. The Strategy covers:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• treasury limits in force which will limit the treasury risk and activities of the Council;</li><li>• prudential and treasury indicators;</li><li>• the current treasury position;</li><li>• prospects for interest rates;</li><li>• the borrowing strategy;</li><li>• the borrowing requirement;</li><li>• debt rescheduling;</li><li>• the investment strategy;</li><li>• the minimum revenue provision policy;</li></ul>

	<p>The primary objective of the Council's treasury management function will continue to be the minimisation of financing costs whilst ensuring the stability of the Authority's long term financial position by borrowing at the lowest rates of interest and by investing surplus cash to earn maximum interest, all at an acceptable level of risk.</p> <p>The overall strategy for 2014/15 will be to finance capital expenditure by running down cash/investment balances and using short term temporary borrowing rather than more expensive longer term loans. The taking out of longer term loans (1 to 10 years) to finance capital spending will only then be considered if required by the Council's underlying cash flow needs. With the reduction of cash balances the level of short term investments will fall. Given that investment returns are likely to remain low (say) 0.50% for the financial year 2014/15, then savings will be made from running down investments rather than taking out more expensive long term loans.</p> <p>This approach does have a refinancing risk and it should be noted that with a 2 pool approach to Housing Revenue Account (HRA) and General Fund (GF) debt, whilst the HRA is fully funded, the GF is carrying all of this risk.</p> <p>All prospects for rescheduling debt will be considered, in order to generate savings by switching from high costing long term debt to lower costing shorter term debt.</p>
<p><b>OPTIONS &amp; RECOMMENDED OPTION</b></p>	<p>It is recommended that Overview and Scrutiny Committee notes the report;</p> <p>It is recommended that Cabinet approves, for onward submission to Council, the:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prudential Indicators forecast for 3 years</li> <li>• Treasury Management Strategy for 2014/15</li> <li>• Minimum Revenue Provision Policy for 2014/15</li> <li>• Schemes of Delegation and Responsibility attached at Appendices 2 and 6</li> </ul> <p>It is recommended that Council approves the report.</p> <p>Reasons for the Decision:</p> <p>It is a requirement of the CIPFA Code that the Council receives an annual treasury management strategy report.</p>
<p><b>IMPLICATIONS:</b></p>	
<p><b>Corporate Aims/Policy Framework:</b></p>	<p>Do the proposals accord with the Policy</p>

	Framework? Yes
<b>Statement by the S151 Officer: Financial Implications and Risk Considerations:</b>	Treasury Management is an integral part of the Council's financial framework and it is essential that the correct strategy is adopted in order to ensure that best value is obtained from the Council's resources and that assets are safeguarded.
<b>Statement by Executive Director of Resources:</b>	There are no additional resource implications.
<b>Equality/Diversity implications:</b>	No
<b>Considered by Monitoring Officer:</b>	Yes
<b>Wards Affected:</b>	All
<b>Scrutiny Interest:</b>	Overview & Scrutiny Committee

**TRACKING/PROCESS**

**EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: Mike Owen**

Chief Executive/ Senior Leadership Team	Cabinet Member/Chair	Ward Members	Partners
Yes	Finance & Resources		
Scrutiny Committee		Committee	Council
Overview & Scrutiny 12/2/14		Cabinet 19/2/14	Council 19/2/14

## 1.0 BACKGROUND

- 1.1 The Council is required to operate a balanced budget, which broadly means that cash raised during the year will meet cash expenditure. Part of the treasury management operation is to ensure that this cash flow is adequately planned, with cash being available when it is needed. Surplus monies are invested in low risk counterparties or instruments commensurate with the Council's low risk appetite, providing adequate liquidity initially before considering investment return.
- 1.2 The second main function of the treasury management service is the funding of the Council's capital plans. These capital plans provide a guide to the borrowing need of the Council, essentially the longer term cash flow planning to ensure that the Council can meet its capital spending obligations. This management of longer term cash may involve arranging long or short term loans, or using longer term cash flow surpluses. On occasion any debt previously drawn may be restructured to meet Council risk or cost objectives.
- 1.3 CIPFA defines treasury management as:  
*"The management of the local authority's investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks."*

## 1.4 Reporting requirements

- 1.4.1 The Council is required to receive and approve, as a minimum, three main reports each year, which incorporate a variety of policies, estimates and actuals.

**Prudential and treasury indicators and treasury strategy** (this report) – the first, and most important report covers:

- the capital plans (including prudential indicators);
- a minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy (how residual capital expenditure is charged to revenue over time);
- the treasury management strategy (how the investments and borrowings are to be organised) including treasury indicators; and
- an investment strategy (the parameters on how investments are to be managed).

**A mid year treasury management report** – This will update members with the progress of the capital position, amending prudential indicators as necessary, and whether the treasury strategy is meeting the strategy or whether any policies require revision.

**An annual treasury report** – This provides details of a selection of actual prudential and treasury indicators and actual treasury operations compared to the estimates within the strategy.

- 1.4.2 The above reports are required to be adequately scrutinised before being recommended to the Council. This role is undertaken by the Overview and Scrutiny Committee.

## 1.5 In Year Monitoring Arrangements

- 1.5.1 Budget monitoring reports are produced on a monthly basis, together with quarterly reporting to Cabinet and the Overview and Scrutiny Committee.

1.5.2 In 2013/14 the average rate of return on investments is 0.82%.

## **1.6 Treasury Management Strategy for 2014/15**

1.6.1 The strategy for 2014/15 covers two main areas:

### **Capital issues**

- the capital plans and the prudential indicators;
- the minimum revenue provision (MRP) strategy.

### **Treasury management issues**

- the current treasury position;
- treasury indicators which limit the treasury risk and activities of the Council;
- prospects for interest rates;
- the borrowing strategy;
- policy on borrowing in advance of need;
- debt rescheduling;
- the investment strategy;
- creditworthiness policy; and
- policy on use of external service providers.

1.6.2 These elements cover the requirements of the Local Government Act 2003, the CIPFA Prudential Code, CLG MRP Guidance, the CIPFA Treasury Management Code and CLG Investment Guidance.

## **1.7 Treasury Management consultants**

1.7.1 The Council uses Capita Asset Services, treasury solutions as its external treasury management advisors.

1.7.2 The Council recognises that responsibility for treasury management decisions remains with the organisation at all times and will ensure that undue reliance is not placed upon our external service providers.

1.7.3 It also recognises that there is value in employing external providers of treasury management services in order to acquire access to specialist skills and resources. The Council will ensure that the terms of their appointment and the methods by which their value will be assessed are properly agreed and documented, and subjected to regular review.

## **2.0 THE CAPITAL PRUDENTIAL INDICATORS 2014/15 – 2016/17**

2.1 The Council's capital expenditure plans are the key driver of treasury management activity. The outputs of the capital expenditure plans are reflected in prudential indicators, which are designed to assist Members overview and confirm capital expenditure plans.

### **2.2 Capital expenditure**

2.2.1 This prudential indicator is a summary of the Council's capital expenditure plans, both those agreed previously, and those forming part of this budget cycle.

<b>Capital Expenditure</b>	<b>2012/13 Actual £'000</b>	<b>2013/14 Estimate £'000</b>	<b>2014/15 Estimate £'000</b>	<b>2015/16 Estimate £'000</b>	<b>2016/17 Estimate £'000</b>
<b>Non-HRA</b>	18,253	17,432	11,770	5,009	3,839
<b>HRA</b>	7,156	8,316	7,895	8,171	8,457
<b>Total</b>	<b>25,409</b>	<b>25,749</b>	<b>19,665</b>	<b>13,180</b>	<b>12,296</b>

## 2.3 The Council's borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement)

2.3.1 The second prudential indicator is the Council's Capital Financing Requirement (CFR). The CFR is simply the total historic outstanding capital expenditure which has not yet been paid for from either revenue or capital resources. It is essentially a measure of the Council's underlying borrowing need. Any capital expenditure above, which has not immediately been paid for, will increase the CFR.

2.3.2 The CFR does not increase indefinitely, as the minimum revenue provision (MRP) is a statutory annual revenue charge which broadly reduces the borrowing need in line with each assets life.

2.3.3 The CFR includes any other long term liabilities (e.g. finance leases). Whilst these increase the CFR, and therefore the Council's borrowing requirement, these types of scheme include a borrowing facility and so the Council is not required to separately borrow for these schemes.

<b>Capital Financing Requirement</b>	<b>2012/13 Actual £'000</b>	<b>2013/14 Estimate £'000</b>	<b>2014/15 Estimate £'000</b>	<b>2015/16 Estimate £'000</b>	<b>2016/17 Estimate £'000</b>
<b>CFR – non HRA</b>	131,233	130,696	130,949	127,894	128,797
<b>CFR – HRA existing</b>	40,531	40,531	40,531	40,531	40,531
<b>Housing Reform Settlement</b>	78,253	78,253	78,253	78,253	78,253
<b>Total CFR</b>	<b>250,017</b>	<b>249,480</b>	<b>249,733</b>	<b>246,678</b>	<b>247,581</b>

## 2.4 Minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy statement

2.4.1 The concept of MRP was introduced in 1989 to prescribe the minimum amount which must be charged to the revenue account each year to meet credit liabilities (borrowing and leasing costs).

2.4.2 The Council will follow the same policy in 2014/15 as it did in 2013/14. Accordingly it is recommended that the:

- Regulatory method for calculating MRP be used for supported borrowing
- Asset Life method of calculating repayment provision be used for unsupported borrowing

2.4.3 It is to be noted that the above policy resulted in MRP savings of £72,000 in 2011/12, £89,700 in 2012/13 and is expected to generate further savings in 2013/14 and 2014/15.

## 2.5 Affordability prudential indicators

2.5.1 The previous sections cover the overall capital and control of borrowing prudential indicators, but within this framework prudential indicators are required to assess the affordability of the capital investment plans. These provide an indication of the impact of the capital investment plans on the Council's overall finances.

## 2.6 Ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream.

2.6.1 This indicator identifies the trend in the cost of capital (borrowing and other long term obligation costs net of investment income) against the net revenue stream.

%	2012/13 Actual	2013/14 Estimate	2014/15 Estimate	2015/16 Estimate	2016/17 Estimate
Non-HRA	3.40%	3.26%	3.18%	3.09%	3.02%
HRA	15.78%	14.81%	14.18%	13.61%	13.61%

2.6.2 The estimates of financing costs include current commitments and the proposals in this budget report.

## 2.7 Incremental impact of capital investment decisions on Council Tax

2.7.1 This indicator identifies the revenue costs associated with proposed changes to the three year capital programme recommended in this budget report compared to the Council's existing approved commitments and current plans. The assumptions are based on the budget, but will invariably include some estimates, such as the level of Government support, which are not published over a three year period.

2.7.2 Incremental impact of capital investment decisions on the band D council tax:

	2012/13 Actual	2013/14 Estimate	2014/15 Estimate	2015/16 Estimate	2016/17 Estimate
<b>Council tax -Band D</b>	£16.33	-£0.18	£0.08	-£1.02	£0.30

## 2.8 Estimates of the incremental impact of capital investment decisions on housing rent levels.

2.8.1 Similar to the council tax calculation, this indicator identifies the trend in the cost of proposed changes in the housing capital programme recommended in this budget report compared to the Council's existing commitments and current plans, expressed as a discrete impact on weekly rent levels.

2.8.2 Incremental impact of capital investment decisions on housing rent levels:

	2012/13 Actual	2013/14 Estimate	2014/15 Estimate	2015/16 Estimate	2016/17 Estimate
<b>Weekly housing rent levels</b>	£0	£0	£0	£0	£0

### 3.0 BORROWING

3.1 The capital expenditure plans set out in Section 2 provide details of the service activity of the Council. The treasury management function ensures that the Council's cash is organised in accordance with the the relevant professional codes, so that sufficient cash is available to meet this service activity. This will involve both the organisation of the cash flow and, where capital plans require, the organisation of appropriate borrowing facilities. The strategy covers the relevant treasury / prudential indicators, the current and projected debt positions and the annual investment strategy.

### 3.2 Current portfolio position

3.2.1 To assist Members in agreeing a strategy for 2014/15 the Council's current treasury portfolio position (at nominal value) is detailed below:

	31st March 2013			Forecast 31st March 2014		
	Principal		Avg. Rate	Principal		Avg. Rate
	£0	£0		£0	£0	
<b>Fixed rate funding</b>						
PWLB Bury	153,862			146,362		
PWLB Airport	4,829			4,078		
Market Bury	39,000	197,691		57,500	207,940	
<b>Variable rate funding</b>						
PWLB Bury	0			0		
Market Bury	0	0		0	0	
<b>Temporary Loans / Bonds</b>	3	3		2,003	2,003	
<b>Total Debt</b>		<b>197,694</b>	<b>4.43%</b>	<b>209,943</b>	<b>4.10%</b>	
<b>Total Investments</b>		<b>17,456</b>	<b>1.68%</b>	<b>25,000</b>	<b>0.82%</b>	

3.2.2 The forecast accumulated capital financing requirement at the end of 2013/14 is £250.0m. The forecast borrowing at the end of 2013/14 is £209.9m meaning that the Authority is under borrowed by £40.1m.

3.2.3 The investment portfolio after the Capital Programme has been spent during 2013/14 is estimated to be around £25m. In preference to taking out long term borrowing, the Authority is taking temporary loans and running down investments to finance capital expenditure because investment returns are low at the present time. The estimated rate of interest on investments for 2013/14 is 0.82% against Capita Asset Services' suggested investment earnings rate for returns on investments placed, for periods up to three months in 2013/14, of 0.50%.

### 3.3 Treasury Indicators: limits to borrowing activity

3.3.1 **The operational boundary.** This is the limit beyond which external debt is not normally expected to exceed. In most cases, this would be a similar figure to the CFR, but may be lower or higher depending on the levels of actual debt.

Operational boundary	2013/14 Estimate £'000	2014/15 Estimate £'000	2015/16 Estimate £'000	2016/17 Estimate £'000
<b>Borrowing</b>	249,500	249,700	246,700	247,600
<b>Other long term liabilities</b>	7,300	7,000	6,700	6,400
<b>Total</b>	<b>256,800</b>	<b>256,700</b>	<b>253,400</b>	<b>254,000</b>



3.3.2 **The authorised limit for external debt.** A further key prudential indicator represents a control on the maximum level of borrowing. This represents a limit beyond which external debt is prohibited, and this limit needs to be set or revised by the full Council. It reflects the level of external debt which, while not desired, could be afforded in the short term, but is not sustainable in the longer term.

This is the statutory limit determined under section 3 (1) of the Local Government Act 2003. The Government retains an option to control either the total of all councils' plans, or those of a specific council, although this power has not yet been exercised.

<b>Authorised limit</b>	<b>2013/14 Estimate £'000</b>	<b>2014/15 Estimate £'000</b>	<b>2015/16 Estimate £'000</b>	<b>2016/17 Estimate £'000</b>
<b>Borrowing</b>	284,500	284,700	281,700	282,600
<b>Other long term liabilities</b>	7,300	7,000	6,700	6,400
<b>Total</b>	<b>291,800</b>	<b>291,700</b>	<b>288,400</b>	<b>289,000</b>

### 3.4 Prospects for interest rates

3.4.1 The Council has appointed Capita Asset Services as its treasury advisor and part of their service is to assist the Council to formulate a view on interest rates. The following table gives their central view.

	<b>Bank Rate %</b>	<b>PWLB Borrowing Rates (including certainty rate adjustment)</b>		
		<b>5 year</b>	<b>25 year</b>	<b>50 year</b>
March 2014	0.50	2.50	4.40	4.40
June 2014	0.50	2.60	4.50	4.50
Sept 2014	0.50	2.70	4.50	4.50
Dec 2014	0.50	2.70	4.60	4.60
March 2015	0.50	2.80	4.60	4.70
June 2015	0.50	2.80	4.70	4.80
Sept 2015	0.50	2.90	4.80	4.90
Dec 2015	0.50	3.00	4.90	5.00
March 2016	0.50	3.10	5.00	5.10
June 2016	0.75	3.20	5.10	5.20
Sept 2016	1.00	3.30	5.10	5.20
Dec 2016	1.00	3.40	5.10	5.20
March 2017	1.25	3.40	5.10	5.20

3.4.2 Until 2013, the economic recovery in the UK since 2008 had been the worst and slowest recovery in recent history. However, growth has rebounded during 2013 to surpass all expectations, propelled by recovery in consumer spending and the housing market.

3.4.3 Forward surveys are also currently very positive in indicating that growth prospects are strong for 2014, not only in the UK economy as a whole, but in all three main sectors, services, manufacturing and construction. This is very encouraging as there does need to be a significant rebalancing of the economy away from consumer spending to construction, manufacturing, business investment and exporting in order for this start to recovery to become more firmly established. One drag on the economy is that wage inflation continues to remain significantly below CPI inflation so disposable income and living standards are under pressure, although income tax cuts have ameliorated this to some extent. This therefore

means that labour productivity must improve significantly for this situation to be corrected by the warranting of increases in pay rates.

3.4.4 The US, the main world economy, faces similar debt problems to the UK, but thanks to reasonable growth, cuts in government expenditure and tax rises, the annual government deficit has been halved from its peak without appearing to do too much damage to growth.

3.4.5 The current economic outlook and structure of market interest rates and government debt yields have several key treasury management implications:

- As for the Eurozone, concerns have subsided considerably in 2013. However, sovereign debt difficulties have not gone away and major concerns could return in respect of any countries that do not dynamically address fundamental issues of long term growth, international uncompetitiveness and the need for overdue reforms of the economy (as Ireland has done). It is, therefore, possible over the next few years that levels of government debt to GDP ratios could continue to rise to levels that could result in a loss of investor confidence in the financial viability of such countries. This could mean that sovereign debt concerns have not disappeared but, rather, have only been postponed. Counterparty risks therefore remain elevated. This continues to suggest the use of higher quality counterparties for shorter time periods;
- Investment returns are likely to remain relatively low during 2014/15 and beyond;
- Borrowing interest rates have risen significantly during 2013 and are on a rising trend. The policy of avoiding new borrowing by running down spare cash balances has served well over the past few years. However, this needs to be continually reviewed to avoid incurring even higher borrowing costs, which are now looming ever closer, where authorities will not be able to avoid new borrowing to finance new capital expenditure and/or to refinance maturing debt, in the near future;
- There will remain a cost of carry to any new borrowing which causes an increase in investments as this will incur a revenue loss between borrowing costs and investment returns.

### **3.5 Borrowing strategy**

3.5.1 The Council is currently maintaining an under-borrowed position. This means that the capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement), has not been fully funded with loan debt as cash supporting the Council's reserves, balances and cash flow has been used as a temporary measure. This strategy is prudent as investment returns are low and counterparty risk is relatively high.

3.5.2 Against this background and the risks within the economic forecast, caution will be adopted with the 2014/15 treasury operations. The Assistant Director of Resources (Finance and Efficiency) will monitor interest rates in financial markets and adopt a pragmatic approach to changing circumstances:

- *if it was felt that there was a significant risk of a sharp FALL in long and short term rates (e.g. due to a marked increase of risks around relapse into recession or of risks of deflation), then long term borrowings will be postponed, and potential rescheduling from fixed rate funding into short term borrowing will be considered.*
- *if it was felt that there was a significant risk of a much sharper RISE in long and short term rates than that currently forecast, perhaps arising from a greater than expected increase in the anticipated rate to US tapering of asset purchases, or in world economic activity or a sudden increase in inflation risks,*

then the portfolio position will be re-appraised with the likely action that fixed rate funding will be drawn whilst interest rates are still lower than they will be in the next few years.

3.5.3 Any decisions will be reported to the appropriate decision making body at the next available opportunity.

### 3.6 Treasury management limits on activity

3.6.1 There are three debt related treasury activity limits. The purpose of these are to restrain the activity of the treasury function within certain limits, thereby managing risk and reducing the impact of any adverse movement in interest rates. However, if these are set to be too restrictive they will impair the opportunities to reduce costs / improve performance. The indicators are:

- Upper limits on variable interest rate exposure. This identifies a maximum limit for variable interest rates based upon the debt position net of investments
- Upper limits on fixed interest rate exposure. This is similar to the previous indicator and covers a maximum limit on fixed interest rates;
- Maturity structure of borrowing. These gross limits are set to reduce the Council's exposure to large fixed rate sums falling due for refinancing, and are required for upper and lower limits.

Interest rate exposures	2014/15 Upper	2015/16 Upper	2016/17 Upper
Limits for fixed interest rates based on net debt	140%	140%	140%
Limits for fixed interest rates based on net debt	-40%	-40%	-40%
<b>Maturity structure of new fixed rate borrowing 2014/15</b>			
	<b>Upper</b>	<b>Lower</b>	
Under 12 months	40%	0%	
12 months and within 24 months	35%	0%	
24 months and within 5 years	40%	0%	
5 years and within 10 years	50%	0%	
10 years and above	90%	0%	

### 3.7 Policy on borrowing in advance of need

3.7.1 The Council will not borrow more than or in advance of its needs purely in order to profit from the investment of the extra sums borrowed. Any decision to borrow in advance will be within forward approved Capital Financing Requirement estimates, and will be considered carefully to ensure that value for money can be demonstrated and that the Council can ensure the security of such funds.

3.7.2 In determining whether borrowing will be undertaken in advance of need the Council will:

- ensure that there is a clear link between the capital programme and maturity profile of the existing debt portfolio which supports the need to take funding in advance of need
- ensure the ongoing revenue liabilities created, and the implications for the future plans and budgets, have been considered
- evaluate the economic and market factors that might influence the manner and timing of any decision to borrow
- consider the merits and demerits of alternative forms of funding
- consider the alternative interest rate bases available, the most appropriate periods to fund and repayment profiles to use

- consider the impact of borrowing in advance on temporarily (until required to finance capital expenditure) increasing investment cash balances and the consequent increase in exposure to counterparty risk, and other risks, and the level of such risks given the controls in place to minimise them.

### 3.8 Borrowing Requirement

3.8.1 Based on a current forecast for the Capital Financing Requirement plus the replacement of existing debt, less the minimum revenue provision (MRP) and the voluntary revenue provision (VRP), the net borrowing requirement for the current year and the next three years is estimated to be as follows.

	<b>2013/14 Estimate £'000</b>	<b>2014/15 Estimate £'000</b>	<b>2015/16 Estimate £'000</b>	<b>2016/17 Estimate £'000</b>
<b>Alternative financing</b>	0	0	0	903
<b>Replacement borrowing</b>	7,779	6,059	11,280	16,994
<b>Borrowing Requirement</b>	<b>7,779</b>	<b>6,059</b>	<b>11,280</b>	<b>17,897</b>

3.8.2 Alternative financing is a combination of running down cash balances and investments and temporary borrowing.

3.8.3 The plan is to use a combination of internal borrowing (i.e. running down cash balances/investments) and temporary borrowing to finance the replacement borrowing, and to only use more long term borrowing (1 to 10 years) if required by the Council's underlying cash flow needs.

3.8.4 The overall effect of the finance costs on the General Fund for the next three years is detailed in the Affordable Borrowing Limit prudential indicator. This ultimately shows the effect of the proposed capital investment decision on the council tax compared to a situation with the same level of capital investment as occurred in the previous year. Changes in the capital investment decision affects the movement in new borrowing for capital purposes, resulting in a change in the finance costs which impacts council tax.

<b>Affordable Borrowing Limit</b>	<b>2013/14 Estimate</b>	<b>2014/15 Estimate</b>	<b>2015/16 Estimate</b>
<b>Increase in Council tax</b>	£0.00	£0.08	£0.00

The increase in Council Tax in 2014/15 relates to slippage on schemes approved in previous years.

### 3.9 Debt rescheduling

3.9.1 As short term borrowing rates will be considerably cheaper than longer term fixed interest rates, there may be potential opportunities to generate savings by switching from long term debt to short term debt. However, these savings will need to be considered in the light of the current treasury position and the size of the cost of debt repayment (premiums incurred).

3.9.2 The reasons for any rescheduling to take place will include:

- the generation of cash savings and / or discounted cash flow savings;
- helping to fulfil the treasury strategy;
- enhance the balance of the portfolio (amend the maturity profile and/or the balance of volatility).

- 3.9.3 Consideration will also be given to identify if there is any residual potential for making savings by running down investment balances to repay debt prematurely as short term rates on investments are likely to be lower than rates paid on current debt.
- 3.9.4 All rescheduling will be reported to the Council, at the earliest meeting following its action.

## **4.0 ANNUAL INVESTMENT STRATEGY**

### **4.1 Investment policy**

- 4.1.1 The Council's investment policy has regard to the CLG's Guidance on Local Government Investments ("the Guidance") and the 2011 revised CIPFA Treasury Management in Public Services Code of Practice and Cross Sectoral Guidance Notes ("the CIPFA TM Code"). The Council's investment priorities will be security first, liquidity second and then return.
- 4.1.2 In accordance with guidance from the CLG and CIPFA, and in order to minimise the risk to investments, the Council has below clearly stipulated the minimum acceptable credit quality of counterparties for inclusion on the lending list. The creditworthiness methodology used to create the counterparty list fully accounts for the ratings, watches and outlooks published by all three ratings agencies with a full understanding of what these reflect in the eyes of each agency. Using Capita Asset Services' ratings service potential counterparty ratings are monitored on a real time basis with knowledge of any changes notified electronically as the agencies notify modifications.
- 4.1.3 Furthermore, the Council's officers recognise that ratings should not be the sole determinant of the quality of an institution and that it is important to continually assess and monitor the financial sector on both a micro and macro basis and in relation to the economic and political environments in which institutions operate. The assessment will also take account of information that reflects the opinion of the markets. To this end the Council will engage with its advisors to maintain a monitor on market pricing such as "credit default swaps" and overlay that information on top of the credit ratings. This is fully integrated into the credit methodology provided by the advisors, Capita Asset Services, in producing its colour codings which show the varying degrees of suggested creditworthiness.
- 4.1.4 Other information sources used will include the financial press, share price and other such information pertaining to the banking sector in order to establish the most robust scrutiny process on the suitability of potential investment counterparties.
- 4.1.5 The aim of the strategy is to generate a list of highly creditworthy counterparties which will also enable diversification and thus avoidance of concentration risk. The intention of the strategy is to provide security of investment and minimisation of risk.
- 4.1.6 Investment instruments identified for use in the financial year are listed in appendix 5.3 under the 'specified' and 'non-specified' investments categories. Counterparty limits will be as set through the Council's treasury management practices – schedules.

## **4.2 Creditworthiness policy**

4.2.1 This Council applies the creditworthiness service provided by Capita Asset Services. This service employs a sophisticated modelling approach utilising credit ratings from the three main credit rating agencies - Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's. The credit ratings of counterparties are supplemented with the following overlays:

- credit watches and credit outlooks from credit rating agencies;
- CDS spreads to give early warning of likely changes in credit ratings;
- sovereign ratings to select counterparties from only the most creditworthy countries.

4.2.2 This modelling approach combines credit ratings, credit watches and credit outlooks in a weighted scoring system which is then combined with an overlay of CDS spreads for which the end product is a series of colour coded bands which indicate the relative creditworthiness of counterparties. These colour codes are used by the Council to determine the suggested duration for investments. The Council will therefore use counterparties within the following durational bands:

- Yellow 5 years
- Dark Pink 5 years for Enhanced money market funds (EMMFs) with a credit score of 1.25
- Light Pink 5 years for EMMFs with a credit score of 1.5
- Purple 2 years
- Blue 1 year (nationalised or semi nationalised UK Banks)
- Orange 1 year
- Red 6 months
- Green 100 days
- No colour not to be used

4.2.3 All credit ratings will be monitored daily and weekly. The Council is alerted to changes to ratings of all three agencies through its use of the Capita Asset Services' creditworthiness service.

- if a downgrade results in the counterparty / investment scheme no longer meeting the Council's minimum criteria, its further use as a new investment will be withdrawn immediately.
- in addition to the use of credit ratings the Council will be advised of information in movements in credit default swap spreads against the iTraxx benchmark and other market data on a weekly basis. Extreme market movements may result in downgrade of an institution or removal from the Council's lending list.

4.2.4 Sole reliance will not be placed on the use of this external service. In addition this Council will also use market data and market information, information on government support for banks and the credit ratings of that supporting government.

## **4.3 Country limits**

4.3.1 The Council has determined that it will only use approved counterparties from countries with a minimum sovereign credit rating of AA- from Fitch Ratings (or equivalent from other agencies if Fitch does not provide). The list of countries that qualify using this credit criteria as at the date of this report are shown in Appendix 4, although the Council's current approach is to use UK High Street Banks and other public bodies. The list of counterparties will be added to, or deducted from, by officers should ratings change in accordance with this policy.

## 4.4 Investment Strategy

4.4.1 **In-house funds.** Investments will be made with reference to the core balance and cash flow requirements and the outlook for short-term interest rates (i.e. rates for investments up to 12 months).

4.4.2 **Investment returns expectations.** Bank Rate is forecast to remain unchanged at 0.5% before starting to rise from quarter 2 of 2016. Bank Rate forecasts for financial year ends (March) are:

- 2013/14 0.50%
- 2014/15 0.50%
- 2015/16 0.50%
- 2016/17 1.25%

4.4.3 There are upside risks to these forecasts (i.e. start of increases in Bank Rate is implemented more quickly) if economic growth remains strong and unemployment falls faster than expected. However, should the pace of growth fall back, there could be downside risk, particularly if Bank of England inflation forecasts for the rate of fall of unemployment were to prove to be too optimistic.

4.4.4 The suggested budgeted investment earnings rates for returns on investments placed for periods up to 100 days during each financial year for the next three years are as follows:

2014/15	0.50%
2015/16	0.50%
2016/17	1.00%
2017/18	2.00%

4.4.5 **Investment treasury indicator and limit** - total principal funds invested for greater than 364 days. These limits are set with regard to the Council's liquidity requirements and to reduce the need for early sale of an investment, and are based on the availability of funds after each year-end.

<b>Maximum principal sums invested &gt; 364 days</b>			
<b>£m</b>	<b>2014/15</b>	<b>2015/16</b>	<b>2016/17</b>
<b>Principal sums invested &gt; 364 days</b>	£10m	£10m	£10m

4.4.6 For its cash flow generated balances, the Council will seek to utilise its business reserve, instant access and notice accounts, money market funds and short-dated deposits (overnight to 100 days) in order to benefit from the compounding of interest.

4.4.7 The Council uses the Co-operative bank for its current account. No funds are invested with the bank. The Council has been given notice by the bank that the current contract with them will not be renewed at the end of its term in March 2015. There is a joint procurement exercise currently being undertaken for a new banking contract.

## **4.5 End of year investment report**

4.5.1 At the end of the financial year, the Council will report on its investment activity as part of its Annual Treasury Report.

## **5.0 EQUALITY & DIVERSITY**

5.1 An initial assessment has been undertaken and it is concluded that there will be no negative impact from this report.

**COUNCILLOR JOHN SMITH**

**DEPUTY LEADER & CABINET MEMBER FOR FINANCE AND CORPORATE AFFAIRS**

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## APPENDIX 1: Interest Rate Forecasts 2014 – 2017

<b>Capita Asset Services Interest Rate View</b>															
	Now	Dec-13	Mar-14	Jun-14	Sep-14	Dec-14	Mar-15	Jun-15	Sep-15	Dec-15	Mar-16	Jun-16	Sep-16	Dec-16	Mar-17
<b>Capita Asset Services Bank Rate View</b>	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.75%	1.00%	1.25%
3 Month LIBID	0.39%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.60%	0.70%	0.90%	1.00%
6 Month LIBID	0.47%	0.60%	0.60%	0.60%	0.60%	0.60%	0.60%	0.60%	0.60%	0.60%	0.70%	0.80%	1.00%	1.20%	1.40%
12 Month LIBID	0.75%	0.80%	0.80%	0.80%	0.80%	0.80%	0.80%	0.80%	0.90%	1.00%	1.20%	1.40%	1.60%	1.80%	2.00%
5yr PWLB Rate	2.38%	2.50%	2.50%	2.60%	2.70%	2.70%	2.80%	2.80%	2.90%	3.00%	3.20%	3.30%	3.50%	3.60%	3.70%
10yr PWLB Rate	3.52%	3.70%	3.70%	3.70%	3.80%	3.80%	3.90%	4.00%	4.10%	4.20%	4.30%	4.40%	4.50%	4.60%	4.60%
25yr PWLB Rate	4.29%	4.40%	4.40%	4.40%	4.50%	4.50%	4.60%	4.70%	4.80%	4.90%	5.00%	5.10%	5.10%	5.10%	5.20%
50yr PWLB Rate	4.33%	4.40%	4.40%	4.40%	4.50%	4.60%	4.70%	4.80%	4.90%	5.00%	5.10%	5.20%	5.20%	5.20%	5.30%
<b>Bank Rate</b>															
Capita Asset Services	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.75%	1.00%	1.25%
UBS	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Capital Economics	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	-	-	-	-	-
<b>5yr PWLB Rate</b>															
Capita Asset Services	2.38%	2.50%	2.50%	2.60%	2.70%	2.70%	2.80%	2.80%	2.90%	3.00%	3.20%	3.30%	3.50%	3.60%	3.70%
UBS	2.38%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Capital Economics	2.38%	2.30%	2.30%	2.30%	2.30%	2.30%	2.30%	2.50%	2.90%	3.30%	-	-	-	-	-
<b>10yr PWLB Rate</b>															
Capita Asset Services	3.52%	3.70%	3.70%	3.70%	3.80%	3.80%	3.90%	4.00%	4.10%	4.20%	4.30%	4.40%	4.50%	4.60%	4.60%
UBS	3.52%	3.90%	4.00%	4.00%	4.10%	4.10%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Capital Economics	3.52%	3.55%	3.55%	3.55%	3.55%	3.55%	3.55%	3.55%	3.55%	3.80%	-	-	-	-	-
<b>25yr PWLB Rate</b>															
Capita Asset Services	4.29%	4.40%	4.40%	4.40%	4.50%	4.50%	4.60%	4.70%	4.80%	4.90%	5.00%	5.10%	5.10%	5.10%	5.20%
UBS	4.29%	4.40%	4.50%	4.50%	4.60%	4.60%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Capital Economics	4.29%	4.25%	4.25%	4.25%	4.25%	4.25%	4.25%	4.25%	4.25%	4.35%	-	-	-	-	-
<b>50yr PWLB Rate</b>															
Capita Asset Services	4.33%	4.40%	4.40%	4.40%	4.50%	4.60%	4.70%	4.80%	4.90%	5.00%	5.10%	5.20%	5.20%	5.20%	5.30%
UBS	4.33%	4.50%	4.50%	4.60%	4.60%	4.70%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Capital Economics	4.33%	4.40%	4.40%	4.40%	4.40%	4.40%	4.40%	4.40%	4.40%	4.50%	-	-	-	-	-

## **APPENDIX 2: Economic Background**

### **1 The UK Economy**

#### **1.1 Economic growth.**

Until 2013, the economic recovery in the UK since 2008 had been the slowest in recent history. However, growth re-emerged in 2013 - quarter 1 (+0.3%), 2 (+0.7%) and 3 (+0.8%). The Bank of England has, therefore, upgraded growth forecasts in the August and November quarterly Inflation Reports for 2013 from 1.2% to 1.6% and for 2014 from 1.7% to 2.8%, (2015 unchanged at 2.3%).

Forward surveys indicate that growth prospects are likely to remain for 2014. One drag on the economy however is that wage inflation continues to remain significantly below CPI inflation so disposable income and living standards remain under pressure.

#### **1.2 Forward guidance.**

The Bank of England issued forward guidance in August which stated that the Bank will not start to consider raising interest rates until the jobless rate (Labour Force Survey / ILO i.e. not the claimant count measure) has fallen to 7% or below. This would require the creation of about 750,000 jobs and was forecast to take three years in August, but revised to possibly quarter 4 2014 in November. The Bank's guidance is subject to three provisos, mainly around inflation; breaching any of them would sever the link between interest rates and unemployment levels. This actually makes forecasting Bank Rate much more complex given the lack of available reliable forecasts by economists over a three year plus horizon. The recession since 2007 was notable for how unemployment did not rise to the levels that would normally be expected in a major recession and the August Inflation Report noted that productivity had sunk to 2005 levels. There has, therefore, been a level of retention of labour, which could mean that there is potential for GDP growth to be accommodated without a major reduction in unemployment. It is therefore increasingly likely that early in 2014, the MPC will need to amend its forward guidance by reducing its 7.0% threshold rate and/or by adding further wording similar to the Fed's move in December (see below).

#### **1.2 Credit conditions.**

While Bank Rate has remained unchanged at 0.5% and quantitative easing has remained unchanged at £375bn in 2013, the Funding for Lending Scheme (FLS) was extended to encourage banks to expand lending to small and medium size enterprises. The second phase of Help to Buy aimed at supporting the purchase of second hand properties, also started in January 2014. These measures have boosted the supply of credit for mortgages, and so of increasing house purchases, (though levels are still far below the pre-crisis level), this led to the Bank of England announcing at the end of November that the FLS for mortgages would end in February 2014. While there have been concerns that these schemes are creating a bubble in the housing market, house price increases outside of London and the south-east have been much weaker. However, bank lending to small and medium enterprises continues to remain weak and inhibited by banks still repairing their balance sheets and anticipating tightening of regulatory requirements.

### **1.3 Inflation.**

Inflation has fallen from a peak of 3.1% in June 2013 to 2.1% in November. It is expected to remain near to the 2% target level over the MPC's two year time horizon.

### **1.4 AAA rating.**

The UK has lost its AAA rating from Fitch and Moody's but that caused little market reaction.

## **2 The Global Economy**

### **2.1 The Eurozone (EZ)**

The sovereign debt crisis has eased during 2013 which has been a year of comparative calm after the hiatus of the Cyprus bailout in the spring. In December, Ireland escaped from its three year EZ bailout programme as it had dynamically addressed the need to substantially cut the growth in government debt, reduce internal price and wage levels and promote economic growth. The EZ finally escaped from seven quarters of recession in quarter 2 of 2013 but growth is likely to remain weak and so will dampen UK growth. The ECB's pledge to buy unlimited amounts of bonds of countries which ask for a bail out has provided heavily indebted countries with a strong defence against market forces. This has bought them time to make progress with their economies to return to growth or to reduce the degree of recession. However, debt to GDP ratios (2012 figures) of Greece 176%, Italy 131%, Portugal 124%, Ireland 123% and Cyprus 110%, remain a cause of concern, especially as many of these countries are experiencing continuing rates of increase in debt in excess of their rate of economic growth i.e. these debt ratios are continuing to deteriorate. Any sharp downturn in economic growth would make these countries particularly vulnerable to a new bout of sovereign debt crisis. It should also be noted that Italy has the third biggest debt mountain in the world behind Japan and the US. Greece remains particularly vulnerable and continues to struggle to meet EZ targets for fiscal correction. Whilst a Greek exit from the Euro is now improbable in the short term, as Greece has made considerable progress in reducing its annual government deficit and a return towards some economic growth, some commentators still view an eventual exit as being likely. There are also concerns that austerity measures in Cyprus could also end up in forcing an exit. The question remains as to how much damage an exit by one country would do and whether contagion would spread to other countries. However, the longer a Greek exit is delayed, the less are likely to be the repercussions beyond Greece on other countries and on EU banks.

Sentiment in financial markets has improved during 2013 as a result of firm Eurozone commitment to support struggling countries and to keep the Eurozone intact. However, the foundations to this current "solution" to the Eurozone debt crisis are still weak and events could easily conspire to put this into reverse. There are particular concerns as to whether democratically elected governments will lose the support of electorates suffering under EZ imposed austerity programmes, especially in countries like Greece and Spain which have unemployment rates of over 26% and unemployment among younger people of over 50%. The Italian political situation is also fraught with difficulties in maintaining a viable coalition which will implement an EZ imposed austerity programme and undertake overdue reforms to government and the economy. There are also concerns over the lack of political will in France to address issues of poor international competitiveness,

## **2.2 The USA**

The economy has managed to return to robust growth in Q2 2013 of 2.5% y/y and 4.1% y/y in Q3, in spite of the fiscal cliff induced sharp cuts in federal expenditure that kicked in on 1 March, and increases in taxation. The Federal Reserve therefore decided in December to reduce its \$85bn per month asset purchases programme of quantitative easing by \$10bn. It also amended its forward guidance on its pledge not to increase the central rate until unemployment falls to 6.5% by adding that there would be no increases in the central rate until 'well past the time that the unemployment rate declines below 6.5%, especially if projected inflation continues to run below the 2% longer run goal'. Consumer, investor and business confidence levels have all improved markedly in 2013. The housing market has turned a corner and house sales and increases in house prices have returned to healthy levels. Many house owners have, therefore, been helped to escape from negative equity and banks have also largely repaired their damaged balance sheets so that they can resume healthy levels of lending. All this portends well for a reasonable growth rate looking forward.

## **2.3 China**

There are concerns that Chinese growth could be on an overall marginal downward annual trend. There are also concerns that the new Chinese leadership have only started to address an unbalanced economy which is heavily dependent on new investment expenditure, and for a potential bubble in the property sector to burst, as it did in Japan in the 1990s, with its consequent impact on the financial health of the banking sector. There are also concerns around the potential size, and dubious creditworthiness, of some bank lending to local government organisations and major corporates. This primarily occurred during the government promoted expansion of credit, which was aimed at protecting the overall rate of growth in the economy after the Lehmans crisis.

## **2.4 Japan**

The initial euphoria generated by "Abenomics", the huge QE operation instituted by the Japanese government to buy Japanese debt, has tempered as the follow through of measures to reform the financial system and the introduction of other economic reforms, appears to have stalled. However, at long last, Japan has seen a return to reasonable growth and positive inflation during 2013 which augurs well for the hopes that Japan can escape from the bog of stagnation and deflation and so help to support world growth. The fiscal challenges though are huge; the gross debt to GDP ratio is about 245% in 2013 while the government is currently running an annual fiscal deficit of around 50% of total government expenditure. Within two years, the central bank will end up purchasing about Y190 trillion (£1,200 billion) of government debt. In addition, the population is ageing due to a low birth rate and, on current trends, will fall from 128m to 100m by 2050.

## **3 Capita Asset Services Forward View**

Economic forecasting remains difficult with so many external influences weighing on the UK. Major volatility in bond yields is likely to endure as investor fears and confidence ebb and flow between favouring more risky assets i.e. equities, and safer bonds.

There could well be volatility in gilt yields over the next year as financial markets anticipate further tapering of asset purchases by the Fed. The timing and degree of tapering could have a significant effect on both Treasury and gilt yields.

Equally, while the political deadlock and infighting between Democrats and Republicans over the budget has almost been resolved the raising of the debt limit, has only been kicked down the road. A final resolution of these issues could have a significant effect on gilt yields during 2014.

The longer run trend is for gilt yields and PWLB rates to rise, due to the high volume of gilt issuance in the UK, and of bond issuance in other major western countries. Increasing investor confidence in economic recovery is also likely to compound this effect as a continuation of recovery will further encourage investors to switch back from bonds to equities.

The overall balance of risks to economic recovery in the UK is currently evenly weighted. However, only time will tell just how long this period of economic growth will last; it also remains exposed to vulnerabilities in a number of key areas.

The interest rate forecasts in this report are based on an initial assumption that there will not be a major resurgence of the EZ debt crisis, or a break-up of the EZ, but rather that there will be a managed, albeit painful and tortuous, resolution of the debt crisis where EZ institutions and governments eventually do what is necessary - but only when all else has been tried and failed. Under this assumed scenario, growth within the EZ will be tepid for the next couple of years and some EZ countries experiencing low or negative growth, will, over that time period, see a significant increase in total government debt to GDP ratios. There is a significant danger that these ratios could rise to the point where markets lose confidence in the financial viability of one, or more, countries. However, it is impossible to forecast whether any individual country will lose such confidence, or when, and so precipitate a resurgence of the EZ debt crisis. While the ECB has adequate resources to manage a debt crisis in a small EZ country, if one, or more, of the large countries were to experience a major crisis of market confidence, this would present a serious challenge to the ECB and to EZ politicians.

Downside risks currently include:

- UK economic growth is currently very dependent on consumer spending and recovery in the housing market. This is unlikely to endure much beyond 2014 as most consumers are maxed out on borrowing and wage inflation is less than CPI inflation, so disposable income is being eroded.
- A weak rebalancing of UK growth to exporting and business investment causing a major weakening of overall economic growth beyond 2014
- Weak growth or recession in the UK's main trading partners - the EU and US, depressing economic recovery in the UK.
- Prolonged political disagreement over the raising of the US debt ceiling.
- A return to weak economic growth in the US, UK and China causing major disappointment in investor and market expectations.
- A resurgence of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis caused by ongoing deterioration in government debt to GDP ratios to the point where financial markets lose confidence in the financial viability of one or more countries and in the ability of the ECB and Eurozone governments to deal with the potential size of the crisis.
- The potential for a significant increase in negative reactions of populaces in Eurozone countries against austerity programmes, especially in countries with very high unemployment rates e.g. Greece and Spain, which face huge challenges in engineering economic growth to correct their budget deficits on a sustainable basis.

- The Italian political situation is frail and unstable; this will cause major difficulties in implementing austerity measures and a programme of overdue reforms. Italy has the third highest government debt mountain in the world.
- Problems in other Eurozone heavily indebted countries (e.g. Cyprus and Portugal) which could also generate safe haven flows into UK gilts, especially if it looks likely that one, or more countries, will need to leave the Eurozone.
- A lack of political will in France, (the second largest economy in the EZ), to dynamically address fundamental issues of low growth, poor international uncompetitiveness and the need for overdue reforms of the economy.
- Monetary policy action failing to stimulate sustainable growth in western economies, especially the Eurozone and Japan.
- Geopolitical risks e.g. Syria, Iran, North Korea, which could trigger safe haven flows back into bonds.

The potential for upside risks to UK gilt yields and PWLB rates, especially for longer term PWLB rates include: -

- An possible upturn in investor confidence that sustainable robust world economic growth is expected, causing a surge in the flow of funds out of bonds into equities.
- A reversal of Sterling's safe-haven status on a sustainable improvement in financial stresses in the Eurozone.
- UK inflation being significantly higher than in the wider EU and US, causing an increase in the inflation premium inherent to gilt yields.
- In the longer term – an earlier than currently expected reversal of QE in the UK; this could initially be implemented by allowing gilts held by the Bank to mature without reinvesting in new purchases, followed later by outright sale of gilts currently held.

### APPENDIX 3: Treasury Management Practice (TMP1) – Credit and Counterparty Risk Management

**SPECIFIED INVESTMENTS:** All such investments will be sterling denominated, with **maturities up to maximum of 1 year**, meeting the minimum 'high' quality criteria where applicable.

**NON-SPECIFIED INVESTMENTS:** These are any investments which do not meet the specified investment criteria. A maximum of 100% \*\* will be held in aggregate in non-specified investment

A variety of investment instruments will be used, subject to the credit quality of the institution, and depending on the type of investment made it will fall into one of the above categories.

The criteria, time limits and monetary limits applying to institutions or investment vehicles are:

	* Minimum credit criteria / colour band	** Max % of total investments	Max. maturity period
<b>DMADF – UK Government</b>	N/A	<b>100%</b>	<b>6 months</b>
UK Government gilts	UK sovereign rating	10%	5 years
UK Government Treasury bills	UK sovereign rating	10%	5 years
Bonds issued by multilateral development banks	UK sovereign rating		6 months
Money market funds	AAA	100%	Liquid
Enhanced money market funds with a credit score of 1.25	AAA	100%	Liquid
Enhanced money market funds with a credit score of 1.5	AAA	100%	Liquid
Local authorities	N/A	100%	5 years
Term deposits with banks and building societies	Yellow Purple Blue Orange Red Green No Colour	100%	Up to 5 years Up to 2 years Up to 1 year Up to 1 year Up to 6 Months Up to 100 days Not for use
CDs or corporate bonds with banks and building societies	Yellow Purple Blue Orange Red Green No Colour	100%	Up to 5 years Up to 2 years Up to 1 year Up to 1 year Up to 6 Months Up to 100 days Not for use
Corporate bond funds		10%	
Gilt funds	UK sovereign rating	10%	
Property funds		10%	

## **APPENDIX 4: Approved countries for investments**

*Based on lowest available rating*

### AAA

- Australia
- Canada
- Denmark
- Finland
- Germany
- Luxembourg
- Norway
- Singapore
- Sweden
- Switzerland

### AA+

- Hong Kong
- U.K.
- U.S.A.

### AA

- Abu Dhabi (UAE)
- France
- Qatar

### AA-

- Belgium
- Saudi Arabia



## APPENDIX 5: DELEGATION AND RESPONSIBILITY

The following personnel are involved on a regular basis in Treasury Management: -

Executive Director of Resources (Mike Owen)	Overall supervision of Treasury Management function and cashflow. Regular reviews of Treasury Management Strategy.
Assistant Director of Resources (Steve Kenyon)	Deputise for the Executive Director of Resources. Direct supervision of Treasury Management function. Assist in reviews of Treasury Management Strategy and monitor performance
Head of Financial Management (Andrew Baldwin)	Deputise for the Executive Director of Resources
Principal Accountant (Management Accountancy) (Jane Bunn)	Manage and undertake day to day Treasury Management Activities in accordance with Treasury Strategy and Policy Statement.
Senior Accountant (Joanne McIntyre)	Deputise for Principal Accountant in her duties as required.
Senior Accountant (Angela Sozansky)	Deputise for Principal Accountant in her duties as required.
Senior Accountancy Assistant (Stephen Blake)	Deputise for Principal Accountant in her duties as required.
Accountancy Assistant (Linda Hughes)	Standby for allocation of short term business via brokers.

Please note that the Council's signatories for treasury management transactions are :-

Mike Owen	Executive Director of Resources
Steve Kenyon	Assistant Director of Resources
Andrew Baldwin	Head of Financial Management
Lewis Magid	Principal Accountant
Jane Bunn	Principal Accountant

## **APPENDIX 6: Treasury management scheme of delegation**

### **(i) Full council**

- receiving and reviewing reports on treasury management policies, practices and activities;
- approval of annual strategy.

### **(ii) Boards/committees/Council/responsible body**

- approval of/amendments to the organisation's adopted clauses, treasury management policy statement and treasury management practices;
- budget consideration and approval;
- approval of the division of responsibilities;
- receiving and reviewing regular monitoring reports and acting on recommendations;
- approving the selection of external service providers and agreeing terms of appointment.

### **(iii) Body/person(s) with responsibility for scrutiny**

- reviewing the treasury management policy and procedures and making recommendations to the responsible body.

## **APPENDIX 7: The treasury management role of the section 151 officer**

### **The S151 (responsible) officer**

- recommending clauses, treasury management policy/practices for approval, reviewing the same regularly, and monitoring compliance;
- submitting regular treasury management policy reports;
- submitting budgets and budget variations;
- receiving and reviewing management information reports;
- reviewing the performance of the treasury management function;
- ensuring the adequacy of treasury management resources and skills, and the effective division of responsibilities within the treasury management function;
- ensuring the adequacy of internal audit, and liaising with external audit;
- recommending the appointment of external service providers.